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Afghanistan 
Paula Kantor and Adam Pain 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines how rural Afghan households in five villages located in Badakhshan and 
Kandahar provinces have negotiated within contexts of weak formal institutions and localized 
power to achieve physical and economic security. The paper uses household case studies to 
assess how the concepts of informal security regimes and dependent security aid understanding 
of the means through which rural households in Afghanistan seek security. It particularly 
examines how different households’ are integrated into social relationships, the variable quality 
and usefulness of these relationships, and under what conditions they might facilitate 
autonomous versus dependent security. In doing so the paper explores the importance of 
context, linking the details of household experiences to their village and provincial locations. It 
provides an understanding of opportunities for and constraints to rural transformation in 
Afghanistan based on the social hierarchies and relations present, illustrating the complexities 
with which interventions aimed at improving human security and reducing poverty must engage, 
interventions which to date have focused more on filling gaps in access to human and material 
resources than on addressing the root causes of poverty.  
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1 Introduction 
The Afghanistan state building project is faltering. Transitions to security, a political settlement, 
institution building, and equitable socio-economic development have not been achieved and 
conditions in Afghanistan are worsening. There are varied reasons for this state of affairs, 
including the limitations of the original Bonn agreement, the confounding of a war on terror with 
a state building project, the creation of a rentier state through excessive aid, divergence 
between the Afghan reality of personality-driven ‘state building’ and the institutionalized vision 
desired by international actors, and the tendency to abstract from politics and approach 
Afghanistan’s challenges from a technical perspective (Suhrke, 2006, Goodhand & Sedra, 2007; 
Forsberg 2010; Kantor 2010). A de jure state may have been re-formed with the trappings of 
democracy, but in effect informal power relations dominate and are diffused through complex 
patronage networks which often benefit the few (Forsberg 2010). National and international 
actors have continued in the post 2001 period to support a variable pattern of localised non-
state regimes.  
This paper examines how rural households in five villages across two provinces have negotiated 
within contexts of weak formal institutions and localized power to achieve some measure of 
physical and economic security.1 It specifically looks at the role of social relationships within 
household livelihoods given both the long term importance of these relationships in the Afghan 
context through its decades of conflict when states and markets were weak to non-existent, and 
their continued importance in the face of the permeability of interests within formal institutions 
in post 2001 Afghanistan. The paper uses household case studies to assess how the concepts of 
informal security regimes and dependent security (Wood 2003, 2004, 2007; Wood and Newton 
2005; Wood and Gough 2006) aid understanding of the means through which rural poor 
households in Afghanistan seek security. Within this, it particularly examines how different 
households’ are integrated into social relationships, the variable quality and usefulness of these 
relationships, and under what conditions they might facilitate autonomous versus dependent 
security. In doing so the paper explores the importance of context, linking the details of 
household experiences to their village and provincial locations. It provides an understanding of 
opportunities for and constraints to rural transformation in Afghanistan based on the social 
hierarchies and relations present, illustrating the complexities with which action aimed at 
improving human security and reducing poverty must engage, action which to date has focused 
more on filling gaps in access to human and material resources than on addressing the root 
causes of poverty.  
The next section draws on the literature on informal security regimes and relational views of 
poverty to provide the conceptual foundation for the paper. This is followed by a summary of 
the methods used in the study and a presentation of the empirical material illustrating the 
diverse roles of social relationships in the five study villages. Finally the data are discussed in 
relation to the literature to illustrate the constraints and opportunities to facilitate rural change 
and poverty reduction in Afghanistan, against recent efforts to do so.  
 
                                                          
1
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2 Seeking security: The role of relationships 
Insecurity in Afghanistan comes from multiple overlapping sources. There is of course the 
growing physical insecurity linked to insurgency which shapes day to day life for many. The 
expanding insurgency is linked in part to a weak state unwilling or unable to deliver basic needs 
or economic opportunities to its citizens and citizen perceptions and experiences of corruption 
(Gardizi et al 2010; Ladbury 2009). The continuing gap between formal state structures and 
people, and peoples’ growing sense of officials’ use of patronage relations for personal political 
and material gain mean the legitimacy of the state is low. Traditional structures, often at 
community level, are perceived as more legitimate though they too can act in favour of the few 
and maintain existing social hierarchies (UNDP 2004; Gardizi et al 2010; Thier 2009).  
Livelihood insecurity is another constant feature of life for the majority of Afghans outside the 
networks of patronage delivering high paid contracts and political positions, and buffeted by 
policy decisions at times oriented to outside political interests, such as those around reducing 
opium poppy cultivation. Markets are perceived as highly risky, controlled by people in power 
(UNDP 2004; Lister & Pain 2004, Flaming & Roe 2009; Shaw 2010); remoteness, climatic shocks, 
lack of investment in or equitable access to basic services, landlessness and dependence, gender 
norms and lack of influence all stymie efforts to make a living (UNDP 2004; Flaming and Roe 
2009; Kantor 2010). ‘Many consequently depend on the precarious support of other people, 
including those providing humanitarian aid’ (UNDP 2004: 55). This may foster dependence on a 
new range of aid actors or reliance on access to forms of support, such as credit or cash for 
work, which may aid survival today but do little in the face of the structural risks to be 
overcome.  
These characteristics of life in Afghanistan illustrate the potential of the informal security regime 
concept (Wood 2004; Wood and Gough 2006), or its recent evolution to wellbeing regimes 
(Wood and Newton 2005; Wood 2007), to inform analysis of poverty and inequality in 
Afghanistan. The latter concept, with its more explicit acknowledgement of political instability 
and role of non-state actors in supporting the achievement of security and well being seems 
particularly suited to the Afghanistan case (Wood and Newton 2005). These concepts highlight 
the inability of the poor to turn to institutions of the state and market to find security given the 
likelihood of self interest outweighing public interest, and of elite capture of markets making the 
state less willing or able to regulate them in the interests of the poor. This means relationships in 
the community and family take central roles. The key issues to explore conceptually and 
empirically then become the quality of these relationships, how well they can deliver security 
and for whom, and what might need to be compromised in this process.  
According to Wood, seeking security is about finding ways to increase predictability (2003, 2004, 
2007). The central question then becomes, what are the sources of unpredictability to be 
countered? Answers to this question influence how one theorises the search for security and the 
interventions needed to support it. While some identify random sources of risk such as ill health 
or floods as those that need guarding against (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999, Dercon 2006), 
others take a broader view of risk to include chronic or structural forms which drive the 
persistence of poverty (Wood 2003, Mosse 2007, Cleaver 2005). These are embedded in the way 
institutions and social relations function and therefore need more than efforts to fill gaps in 
human or material resources to remedy their effects.  
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Those taking a structural approach to risk and insecurity identify institutional reform through 
political struggle as the means to create a system less inimical to the poor and less powerful 
(Cleaver 2005, Wood 2004, Hickey & du Toit 2007). Such reform would increase the control and 
agency of the poor (Wood 2007). However, the barriers to such action are high among the poor 
for a range of reasons, from the potential for competition for resources among those with less 
reducing their solidarity to the fear of losing what one has within the current system by acting 
against it or fear of retribution for any such action (du Toit 2004, Wood 2003, 2007).  
The latter fears are considered particularly strong barriers to action due to the need for the poor 
to invest in the existing system in order to achieve some measure of security in the present. One 
expected effect of insecurity among the poor is to move their focus to ensuring security for the 
present, over valuing longer term investments in future security (Wood 2003, 2004, 2007; Mosse 
2007; Hickey & du Toit 2007). While there is some debate over the extent of choice involved in 
this privileging of the present over the future (Hickey & Du Toit 2007), there is more agreement 
around the role of social relationships in providing security today. However, much of this focus is 
on the role of hierarchical relationships relative to those of reciprocity more likely to be 
characterized by equality.  
Given the time and risks involved in seeking to change the existing system, the agency of the 
poor is thought to focus on negotiating within it, particularly in relation to establishing and 
maintaining relationships with those who have more scope to deliver immediate benefits – from 
employment to housing to credit (Mosse 2007; Cleaver 2005; Hickey & du Toit 2007; Wood 
2004). The privileging of social relationships reflects the reliance on community and family 
resources in many contexts, given the uncertain and unequal access to institutions of the state 
and market. Such privileging fits the Afghan context where mutual support mechanisms and 
traditional structures have over the decades of conflict as well is in the post 2001 period been 
those more likely to provide some measure of security (UNDP 2004, GoA 2008). Social 
relationships appear to be valued both as ends in themselves – to signal belonging and hence 
qualification for support, and as means through which to access other resources of interest 
(Bebbington 1999; Copestake 2007, White & Ellison 2007). In fact past research by the 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has illustrated the actions taken by households 
to strengthen or maintain these relationships, from returnee households conforming to social 
practices such as limits on female mobility to maintain family relationships (Saito 2009) to 
borrowing microcredit to pass on to others in order to cement reciprocal or hierarchical 
relations (Kantor 2009).  
The primacy of securing the present necessitates engaging within existing institutional structures 
and relations. For the poor, this is thought to bring a negative mix of political exclusion (little 
influence or voice) and economic and social inclusion under adverse terms (Wood 2003, 2004, 
2007; Mosse 2007). Hence security through social relationships comes at a cost – dependence 
within clientelist relationships. These relationships of inequality limit the poor’s scope for 
agency, apart from action within the system to strengthen their position and belonging, also 
identified more generally as the social compliance required to demonstrate continued 
worthiness as clients (Cleaver 2005; Harriss-White 2005; Wood 2003). These compromises 
perpetuate the system’s inequities, illustrating a relational view of poverty where some – those 
with resources and autonomy – gain from the dependence of the poor (Mosse 2007) and both 
groups are not positioned to change this.  
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While it might be easy to conclude that dependent forms of security are all negative, it is 
important to remember what they can deliver, that there will be different levels of dependence 
within the relationships depending on the parties involved – who they are and the diversity and 
level of their social and material resources. Therefore rapid removal of these relationships may 
do more harm than good (Hickey & du Toit 2007). Variation in actors’ abilities to negotiate their 
terms of inclusion in relationships will lead to diverse placements along a continuum of 
dependent security, with different associated outcomes. Such diversity may allow for different 
options for exit, more or less voice, and different commitments to loyalty. While some of these 
opportunities may be individual versus collective, leaving the system unchanged, use of 
patronage among those in positions of authority may deliver wider benefits, depending on the 
extent to which social good outweighs personal aims. Hence, more conceptual options 
describing terms of inclusion and exclusion and their outcomes, such as the framework Kabeer 
developed to incorporate those who are included on their own terms, others on adverse terms, 
those who exclude themselves through choice, and others who are excluded and hence made 
destitute (2000), is useful. This paper seeks to identify this diversity of dependence across select 
village contexts and household cases to understand the types and quality of social resources in 
rural Afghanistan, how they are used and useful, and under what conditions some might escape 
dependence, individually or collectively. Before moving onto to this empirical material, it is 
important to say a few words about reciprocity.  
The literature developing a relational and institutional conceptualisation of risk and poverty 
tends to focus more on hierarchical relationships than those characterized by reciprocity. 
Reciprocal relationships are recognized as a means to deliver social protection for the poor but 
often only in the short term or at a level sufficient to support survival versus advancement 
(Wood 2007, 2003; Cleaver 2005). This is because they tend to be networks among the poor, 
limited by few resources and difficult to sustain. However, the Afghan case exemplifies the 
central role of reciprocity (as well as patron/client relations) in the sustenance of livelihoods 
during the decades of conflict (GoA 2008; UNDP 2004). Studies of credit relationships in rural 
Afghanistan since 2002 illustrate the considerable resources available through informal 
reciprocal networks, supporting cultural resources such as marriage, consumption smoothing, 
crisis response and productive investments (Klijn & Pain 2007; Kantor 2009). While perhaps 
insufficient to challenge the status quo, the role of reciprocity and particularly in relation to 
access to credit, will be examined to determine under what conditions it might weaken the hold 
of dependent relationships and support individual progress, and what its limits are.  
3 Methods 
This ESRC-DFID funded study aimed to assess patterns of rural livelihood change across Afghan 
contexts to understand notions of resilience and adaptation in conditions of state weakness. It 
builds from a previous study by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 
documenting the state of rural livelihoods in Afghanistan in 2003-04 (Grace & Pain 2004). It 
revisits a selection of field sites to understand how and why changes occurred over the period 
2003-2009. It was carried out by AREU and its partners, with the grant held by the School of 
Development Studies at UEA.  
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The initial 2003-04 study was conducted in 21 villages across 7 provinces. Fewer provinces were 
covered in this second phase due to its in depth qualitative approach requiring more time per 
site than the quantitative approach used in 2003-04, and due to security concerns. The study 
was carried out in 11 villages across four provinces (Kandahar, Badakhshan, Saripol and Faryab). 
There was some variation in how the study proceeded in each site. For Kandahar and 
Badakhshan NGO partners involved in the first phase study carried out the field work for this 
phase, after initial training and continuous monitoring from AREU. In Kandahar, even though the 
partner had long connections to the province, it could only safely carry out research in two of 
the three villages from the 2003 study. An AREU field team carried out the study in the three 
Saripol villages and also did the research in Faryab. However the Faryab work proceeded much 
differently to the other sites due to recent insurgent incursions into the study district. Data were 
collected primarily at the village level through focus group discussions held in the provincial 
capital with key informants and household respondents from the previous study to understand 
the effects of two major events: periods of drought and the district’s growing insecurity.  
The first study phase done in 2003-04 collected quantitative data from 20 households per 
village, distributed across wealth groups as defined by village elders. The second phase identified 
the 20 households (or those still remaining), had initial informal conversations with men and 
women from each, and then used this information to select eight households for in depth 
interviews. Selection was guided by diversity according to wealth group, livelihood trajectories 
(when such variation existed), household size and composition, land holdings and livelihood 
portfolios. The field teams primarily applied retrospective in depth interview techniques to 
explore household lives and livelihoods over this period and to understand how and why 
different decisions were taken and with what effects. The teams were composed of two female 
and two male Afghan interviewers, guaranteeing they could speak to both male and female 
respondents. In total at least four interviews were held per household (though not in Faryab), 
two with men and two with women. This information, along with the data from the initial 
informal interviews, provided a wealth of detail. This detail from the micro level was augmented 
by data collected on the study villages and districts such that household experiences could be 
understood within their contexts.  
This paper focuses on the data from the Badakhshan and Kandahar case studies to examine the 
responses of the study households to experiences of state and institutional weakness as 
exemplified in these areas.2 It will draw comparisons across village contexts and then illustrate 
household experiences within these, to show the diverse ways social relationships are 
meaningful to livelihood outcomes, for better or for worse.  
4 Household cases in context 
This section provides a brief overview of the two provinces on which this paper focuses to 
provide an understanding of their historical and demographic contexts. Then more detailed 
village and household case data are presented to illustrate how different actors, within their 
village locations, have used social relationships and to what end.3 These data will be reflected on 
                                                          
2
 See Kantor & Pain 2010 for a longer version of this paper incorporating all field sites. 
3
 Due to constraints on length only selected household cases will be drawn upon from each village. 
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in the discussion section to follow, referring back to the literature on informal security regimes, 
adverse incorporation and dependent security.  
4.1 Kandahar 
Kandahar province, located in the south, is the largest in Afghanistan. It is Pashtun dominated 
and Kandahar city is the second largest in the country, with an estimated 374,200 residents.4  
The province is agriculturally rich due to its irrigation resources and supports horticultural 
production including raisins and pomegranates. Kandahar city also offers a vibrant urban 
economy linked to licit and illicit cross border trade, a booming construction sector and a large 
international presence with its considerable aid expenditures.  
Kandahar has been central to Afghanistan’s political development as the origin of most of the 
country’s ruling elites (Giustozzi & Ullah 2007). Tribal dynamics and power struggles are 
important to the province’s political history. The main tribal alliance is the Zirak Durrani, 
comprised of five tribes (Popalzai, Barakzai, Achekzai, Mohammadzai and Alakozai). However the 
post 2001 period has been characterized by competing efforts to gain and maintain control in 
the province within this alliance between the Popalzai and Barakzai.  
Prior to this, in the period after the Soviet withdrawal, new strongmen emerged to gain control 
of tribes (Giustozzi & Ullah 2007, Forsberg 2010). These were men not linked to previous landed 
elite but men who had gained power through jihad. However the loss of external funding for the 
mujahidin left these leaders fragmented and without resources, leading to conflict among them. 
This supported the rise of the Taliban. The period of Taliban rule provided physical security but 
overlapped with a period of drought (1994-98). Opium cultivation increased during this time as a 
means of economic survival.  
After the Taliban’s fall, strongmen re-established their positions in part through seizing or 
annexing land and becoming landlords, but taking on only some of the related obligations 
(Giustozzi & Ullah 2007). This shift to landlord status strengthened social hierarchies and patron-
client relations within villages as well as from these village power holders outward as they 
sought a broader range of resources through which to maintain their power and status. Sources 
of resources include political elites in the centre and province as well as international actors 
keen to maintain positions in Kandahar from which they could support their military and 
development interventions (Forsberg 2010). It was at this time that the Barakzai and Popalzai 
rivalry emerged, with the Popalzai winning control in time though Ahmad Wali Karzai’s5 
leadership of the provincial council and his amassing of a ‘political and commercial empire’ in 
the province (Forsberg 2010: 17); Ahmad Wali’s personal links to Hamid Karzai in Kabul create 
important connections between Kandahar and the center of power. The district in which the 
study was done includes the home village of the Karzai family and is associated with the 
Popalzai. Therefore, as will become apparent below, connections to the Karzai family are 
valuable social resources for some study village residents. 
Appendix 1 provides a comparison of the two Kandahar study villages across a range of 
characteristics. Both are similar in terms of location, livelihood opportunities and experience of 
                                                          
4 Central Statistics Organization. 2010. Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2010/11. GoIRA: Kabul.  
5
 Ahmad Wali Karzai is President Hamid Karzai’s younger half-brother.  
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the decades of conflict. However, their defining characteristic, shared but evident in different 
ways, is the presence of a strong social hierarchy which displays little more than self interest in 
the way in which the villages are ruled. In village KA it is one large khan (landowner) who wields 
power. He is the head of the village and its community development council (CDC) and an 
elected member of the provincial council. He holds considerable lands, along with a second 
major landowner (in another half of the village), and cultivates it largely through sharecrop 
arrangements with villagers. Many of the sharecroppers are in migrants with few of their own 
independent connections in the village; he provides many with housing as well as land and does 
not offer any form of secure contract in order to maintain his power and their allegiance. Village 
KB’s social hierarchy is slightly more diffuse – spread among six maliks (village leaders) though 
the head malik is most powerful. He too is linked to provincial and central political power and 
receives patronage from these sources for his own advantage. While the study district receives a 
high level of aid due to its relative security, there is little evidence of its equitable distribution. 
Many services (health, education) are accessed in the city, for those who can afford to travel, 
and diverse respondents reported how the local CDCs, which manage block grants, have acted in 
the interests of the elite with little recourse for complaint.  
The villages are socially conservative and access to education has been limited for men and boys 
and largely absent for women and girls except for one literacy course in village KB which was 
later commandeered by the malik. The connections of the village elite to Ahmad Wali Karzai and 
national political figures along with proximity to Kandahar city provides, under the present 
political arrangements, a relative degree of physical security. The proximity to Kandahar city has 
also offered economic opportunities from which the elite have disproportionately benefited. But 
even some of those lower in the social hierarchy have been able to achieve a degree of 
economic independence from the agrarian village economy. The means through which some 
individual households have reduced their dependence within existing social structures is 
explored in the household cases, as are more general patterns in how social relationships have 
contributed to livelihoods.  
These two study villages provide examples of what Kabeer labelled ‘privileged inclusion’ (2000: 
87) – those at the center of social institutions with the influence to shape the social life of others 
through regulating social norms and practices. The main landlord (LLA) in village KA is one, as is 
the head malik (HH B40) in village KB. LLA was not a respondent in the study but his position in 
the village became clear through reports of others’ interactions with him and a key informant 
interview with him. His control of land and his hiring of many sharecroppers who are in-migrants 
to the village give him considerable power over the village and others’ lives. He gives and takes 
sharecrop contracts without seeming concern for the welfare of his clients (see case A00 below), 
and field staff described those who work for him, including women who work within his home, 
as subservient, having to do his bidding in order to maintain their employment. All of this signals 
a weak moral economy within the village, particularly in the sense of the obligations of the 
wealthy. This dovetails with Giustozzi and Ullah’s (2007) analysis of the new generation of power 
holders in Kandahar, who consolidated influence through gaining land but only took on some of 
the related obligations of patronage. Self interest rules. This is also clear in LLA’s role as head of 
the community council, won through pressure on sharecroppers to show up and vote for him, as 
many reported. He used this influence to pave the road to and from his home, but not 
throughout the village. His power extends outside the village where he is an elected member of 
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the provincial council, over which Ahmad Wali Karzai presides. This connects him to considerable 
economic and political power in the province and country. These links to the government also 
make him a target of Taliban factions. Hence one reason for paving the road was to make the 
presence of improvised explosive devices more apparent, and he requires the service of his 
clients in providing eyes and ears for protection. If anyone sees anything suspicious they know to 
report it to LLA or his guard force – this reportedly has saved him from two bomb attacks.  
The head of household B40 achieves power in village KB largely through his leadership of the 
CDC and the control of its benefits, and not through land ownership. Like LLA his relationships 
with villagers, including a number of relatives among them, is exploitative. The obligatory aspect 
of patron-client relations is weak to non-existent. In fact he displays ruthlessness in 
accumulation that counters presumptions around the role of mutual support networks in rural 
Afghanistan, and particularly among kin. He ignores a poor nephew’s household (HHB56) though 
the young family is very energetic and strategic in building its livelihood and could benefit from 
short term support. More dramatically, he essentially hastened the death of his brother (HHB58) 
by not providing his young nephews credit to meet emergency medical costs; he then was 
reported to dupe his sister in law out of the deeds to his brother’s land, driving the family into 
livelihood decline. One nephew from B58 describes B40’s power and their own lack of voice in 
this way: ‘We were young and we were afraid that he would kill us, therefore we couldn’t say 
anything.’ Finally HHB57, also the household of a deceased brother of B40 (headed now by 
another of B40’s nephews), reports how B40 took over what was a family jewellery business 
after the brother’s death. ‘He is my paternal uncle and that shop was left to us; we thought we 
would also have part of that shop and five years ago I asked him about it. He smiled and told me, 
“That shop is mine and who are you to ask?”’ LLA and B40 exemplify how the poverty of some 
supports the accumulation of others; they are the patrons who control local fiefdoms ensuring 
benefits come to them at the expense of others, even family. Among the wealthier households 
in the respondent groups are those who could be called secondarily included, using Kabeer’s 
(2000) terminology. These are actors who are a step removed from the privileged insiders. They 
do not have the insiders’ consolidated power or influence locally, but instead are linked to those 
with influence and gain advantages through these. They are included into existing systems from 
a relatively strong position, due to their diverse resources and relationships. HHs A10 and A05 in 
village KA fall into this group. A10 is the second land owner in the village, having significant 
businesses in the village (brick kiln, cattle market and slaughterhouse) and many male workers 
to draw on to manage them and their agricultural land. The head is also connected to Ahmad 
Wali Karzai, obtaining work for one son as his driver and able to draw upon him for help with 
business contracts and managing municipal regulations. Social connections to this economic and 
political power holder have added security to an already diversified livelihood. A05 came from 
humble beginnings to build wealth primarily through a contracting business and its expansion; 
the household, like most in village A, does not own land but through connections to both 
landlords it has made significant economic progress. He initially leased out LLA’s land and 
managed the sharecroppers; because of the limited income from this work he started to slowly 
get work managing construction contracts – managing the land leasing, labour contracting and 
the like. As this was successful he continued to expand the services provided, including building 
materials. A10 was an important contact here, with its brick kiln. A10 gave bricks on credit which 
helped A05 expand into building material provision. A05 again had sufficient male labour to 
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support this work – a key condition for its success along with proximity to Kandahar city. 
However without the strategic connections to the two village landlords his accumulation process 
would have been less rapid.  
In village KB the cases of secondary inclusion revolve around the employment benefits derived 
from links to Ahmad Wali Karzai, the President and fellow jihadis. B42 is another household 
coming from a position of relative poverty and insecurity to build a more secure and prosperous 
livelihood, due to access to regular employment for three sons. Its security has come since 2007 
when two sons obtained work as soldiers in Kandahar city through an old jihadi colleague, and 
another obtained work as a guard in the President’s office due to the father’s connections to the 
Karzai brothers. His income has now increased by 290,000 Afs ($5,800) per month allowing him 
to improve their home and marry a much younger wife after the death of his first. His 
connections outside the village have gained him social status in the village too, shown through 
his selection as assistant malik. Household B48 started out with inherited social and economic 
position, unlike B42, but it also gained through connections to the Karzais and the employment 
of one son in Kabul on security detail, netting 20,000 Afs regularly per month, to add to the 
household’s income from raisins and a freight haulage business.  
A number of case households also showed clear evidence of being enmeshed in exploitative 
relationships of dependence with those more powerful; these were more common among the 
KA households due to LLA’s role. Among all such households there was a range of levels of 
dependence, as well as one household in village KA which moved itself out of a relationship with 
LLA.  
The more extreme cases of dependent security include two in village KA and one in KB. A00 and 
A12 are the two poorest households among the respondent cases in both Kandahar villages and 
both are heavily dependent on LLA. A00 is worse off, with an aged and ill male head and an ill 
only son and therefore no able bodied male labour. The household moved to KA from another 
village which in 2001 fell into Taliban control; they therefore lost access to their own lands. In 
village KA the male head obtained sharecrop land and a home from LLA; this lasted for three 
years after which LLA took the lands and home back after the head of household fell off a tractor 
and injured his legs. His fitness for work was in question and instead of leading to obligations on 
the landlord’s part, this accident led to loss of livelihood for A00. LLA introduced them to 
another landlord who provided a house, but in a very bad condition and position. The wife still 
works as a servant in LLA’s home, but for no wage, only for leftover food. ‘She goes in the 
morning and comes back in the afternoon. She also brings their leftover food. She serves the 
women with washing and cleaning. She doesn’t have a wage. If we ask for one, they will fire us. 
Ten years she has worked there.’ This is their primary source of support, since the male head 
and son are unfit for work. They also survive from the brideprice obtained for a 16 year old 
daughter recently married. Household B46 similarly lost its access to sharecrop land but this 
time after a 20 year history with its landlord. This happened reportedly because a relative of the 
landlord returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan, but also because of perceived lack of loyalty. 
The female household head reported that the landlord wanted farmers to work ‘honestly’ on the 
land – not work for multiple farmers at one time. Her sons had more than one contract so she 
felt this had a role in the loss of land. The household’s need for credit as part of its survival 
strategy means it cannot risk the relationship with the landlord by complaining about the loss of 
sharecrop contract. Therefore its voice is diminished because of a lack of alternative credit 
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options, while the pro-action on the part of the sons in seeking multiple work opportunities was 
a threat to the landlord and therefore to be punished.  
Household A12 has a female working as a servant in LLA’s home and also lives in a house LLA 
provides. While A00 was dependent on LLA because of a lack of additional workers, A12 is 
dependent through having three sources of work through LLA. Along with the female head, one 
son (at the time of interview living outside the household) worked as part of LLA’s security detail 
and one son sharecropped land. This sharecrop arrangement is more recent and provides a 
measure of food security but at the cost of a clear understanding of the need to, as a son says, 
“take care of the connection in order not to lose lands and work”. The female head gets food 
from LLA’s household, and the family also has credit links to LLA, most recently through a loan to 
meet a son’s marriage costs. However, unlike A00, this household has more male workers and so 
also has two sons working with the second landlord in seasonal brick making. While this income 
is not regular, it provides links to another potential patron and some options. That said, the 
household is aware of its lack of independence, as the son says: ‘There are…people in this village 
who have a comfortable life, they are not tied to one work. They can always shift their work to a 
more profitable work, but we cannot’.  
Household A16 has done better in expanding its alternatives to dependence on LLA than those 
from village KA described above. It has gradually improved its economic condition, after arriving 
in the village in 1997 through a relative who was a sharecropper for LLA. On arriving, given the 
age of their relative, LLA took the lands from him and gave them to this family, showing his 
arbitrary use of power. LLA also gave them a house but from savings A16 was able to buy the 
land and house and therefore achieve some measure of distance from LLA. An uncle provided 
assistance through credit and was a consistent source of support to A16 – providing an 
alternative to LLA. Like A12 this household has multiple able bodied men in the household, so 
while one son works the land (providing 10 months worth grain per year), one works in the brick 
kiln and in other casual labour, and another works as a vender in the city. Females also do 
embroidery work. So while a link to LLA is still important to their livelihood security, they have 
more options than A00 or A12.  
Household A03 was able to move out of its dependence on LLA, driven by the male head’s 
disability, his forward orientation and supported by the vibrant urban informal economy of 
Kandahar and strong informal credit relationships. The male head was raised in village KA by an 
uncle and hence has a long connection in the village. He fought with the mujahidin under LLA 
and was wounded. On return to the village LLA gave him land to sharecrop, potentially showing 
some form of obligation in return for his military service and injury. On being unable to cultivate 
the land himself he leased it out and still had sufficient produce to feed his family. This freed him 
to start a small shoe vending business in the city in 2003; as it grew he realized independence 
from LLA by giving up the farming land, perhaps in recognition of the likelihood of the land being 
taken given other examples of this in the village, and buying land from LLA to build a home. The 
investment in the shoe business and the head’s absolute commitment to educate his sons shows 
more agency and future orientation compared to others. While in debt due to the land purchase 
(he is currently renting out the house to cover construction costs) and purchase of a motorized 
rickshaw through which he can take his boys to school in the city, he and his wife are confident 
they can repay. This case is also interesting because in other households having multiple male 
workers helped provide some security; here there is only one male worker but his agency and 
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willingness to take some risks have helped the household gain independence. Whether the 
household is secure is another question, since anything that threatens their one income source 
could bring immediate decline.  
Many cases in both villages, particularly among the middle wealth groups, illustrate the vital role 
of mutual support networks, specifically informal credit, to livelihood stability, and for some, to 
slow improvement.6 This is particularly the case due to the villages’ proximity to Kandahar city 
and its opportunities for productive investment. A03 was an example of this, as were A16 and 
B56. In the latter case it was links to the wife’s family, which is better off, which provided 
consistent access to credit free of interest that facilitated the energetic focus of the male head 
on a range of activities to improve his family’s condition. Reputation and belonging were noted 
to be important in order to maintain these networks, particularly a reputation for repaying 
credit and therefore creditworthiness. However, for all the weight placed on relationships of 
mutual obligation in Afghanistan, including in the government’s social protection strategy, there 
are also limits to them that cannot be ignored. The case of household A19 illustrates the 
uncertainty attached to informal relationships of support, even from relatives. This widow 
headed household has lived free of rent in her brother’s house in village KA for 10 years but was 
awaiting a visit from him to determine if this arrangement would continue or if they would be 
asked to pay rent. The terms of engagement among relatives and within all relationships are of 
course also important to assess and not presume, as was clear in the predatory relationship B40 
had with his relatives in village KB.  
Clear social inequalities that played out to differing degrees depending on the diffuseness of 
social power define the Kandahar village contexts. This meant that the use of social resources 
among case study households within each village varied largely by the households’ social 
position and by individual factors, such as presence of able bodied male labour and willingness 
to take risks, supported by the proximity to Kandahar city.  
4.2 Badakhshan  
Badakhshan province is located in the northeast of Afghanistan. It is one of Afghanistan’s larger 
provinces by area, and is mountainous, sparsely populated, remote and relatively 
underdeveloped. Its access links to the rest of the country are via one road which is often 
impassable due to rain, snow, avalanches or mudslides (Giustozzi & Orsini 2009; Pain 2010). It is 
a multi-ethnic province with Tajiks and Uzbeks composing the majority along with smaller 
minority groups including the Ismailis. It has a history of chronic food insecurity and recent data 
show that 73 percent of rural households reported low dietary diversity (NRVA 2005). Major 
livelihood activities include agriculture, livestock, trade and services, and non farm labour. 
Opium cultivation rose in prominence by 2000 and lasted through 2007; after this time, 
cultivation bans, threats of eradication and shifting terms of trade between opium and wheat 
led to a decline in cultivation, along with a decline in prosperity for those cultivating or 
otherwise benefiting from the multiplier effect on the rural economy (Pain 2010). One 
interesting characteristic of the province is a growth in the educated classes since the 1960s. 
This has led to significant investment in education in the province, which is estimated to have 
the highest rural literacy of provinces away from Kabul (Giustozzi & Orsini 2009; MRRD n.d.). 
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This will be an important factor for one of the study villages and is a key point of contrast with 
Kandahar.  
Badakhshan has had a fragmented political landscape in part due to its terrain and the attendant 
difficulties of extending and maintaining control as well as due to its ethnic diversity (Giustozzi & 
Orsini 2009). It, as is common in Afghanistan, is characterized by patrimonial politics with the 
new government in 2002 and subsequent rounds of elections doing little to change this. Karzai 
seeks to maintain control in the province, to counter a local rival. He therefore supports his own 
representative, Zalmay Khan7, in the province giving him a free hand in making political 
appointments to secure Karzai support (Giustozzi & Orsini 2009). However, internal control 
remains a challenge and local power holders maintain a strong hand in their areas with little 
ability to consolidate power. According to Giustozzi and Orsini’s analysis this inability to 
consolidate power limits interest in investing in longer term development needs; short term 
interests of these local leaders take priority.  
Appendix 2 compares and contrasts the three Badakhshan study villages across a range of 
characteristics. It illustrates how considerably they vary in location, accessibility, demographics 
and educational investments, exposure to conflict, local leadership and external connections and 
their usefulness. In the case of village BA, an early investment in education facilitated its ability 
to build external networks that were strategically useful, for example in shielding the village 
form the worst of the conflicts. Education and the positioning of educated village residents in 
government posts and in NGO employment also came together to foster a social orientation in 
the village such that gains from access to employment in nearby lapis lazuli mines were reported 
to be distributed in the village and efforts among leaders were geared to accessing public and 
social goods versus only self enrichment. This positioned the village to cope with livelihood 
declines like drought and weakening of political connections linked to the mines. The village has 
maintained a measure of strategic political independence as well, evidenced by its refusal to 
support either main candidate in the 2009 Presidential election.  
For village BB there is little evidence of engagement with the wider world prior to 1978, possibly 
due to its relatively secure agrarian economy. Helped by its defensive position after 1978 the 
village was able to organise military power that successfully provided security against external 
forces. After the departure of the Soviets, self-interest of the village power holders became 
more evident, reflecting perhaps the greater wealth inequalities of this village compared with 
the other two. As a consequence, there does not appear to have been the degree of social 
concern for the village by its leadership that is evidenced in village BA, and there has been 
limited action to secure public goods and development investment since 2001. Small and 
economically and socially marginal village BC gained physical security by achieving protectorate 
status under commander Qutbuddin and creating local strategic alliances. However, its lack of 
economic, social and political resources has limited the provision of public goods to its residents 
who face the harshest conditions among the three villages.  
In Badakhshan, the study villages are quite different in terms of social structure and orientation 
toward the future and social goods. These differences have produced more variation in the use 
and usefulness of social relationships across the three villages in Badakhshan, with village BA 
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 Zalmay Khan is the son of a local elder who had a close relationship to Karzai prior to returning to 
Badakhshan. He won a seat in Afghanistan’s parliament in late 2005. 
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particularly standing out. Village BC most closely follows the pattern of social power found in the 
Kandahar villages, though not due to internal wealth differences. The village’s outside protector, 
commander Qutbuddin, as well as a few others, exert considerable influence in the village, often 
to serve their own ends. Links to Qutbuddin are useful for residents but can also be exploitative, 
as the case of household C43 shows. Qutbuddin was able to assist the male head during the 
mujahidin period to spare him from conscription because he was the only male in the household 
at that time. However the head of C43 also relates how Qutbuddin is the authority turned to for 
dispute resolution due to the disfunctionality of the local shura. This help is not always free. He 
related a case of the commander extorting 5000 Afs from him to settle an inheritance dispute. 
This head of household was lucky because an uncle intervened on his behalf to try to reverse the 
request or pay it himself. This illustrates the presence, not unusually, of help relations among 
relatives in the village.  
There is also a general from the village, appointed to a post outside of the province, who 
exercises power locally. Household C49 experienced this at great cost. A son was demanded to 
serve as guard for the general which the household head could not refuse at risk of angering the 
general. However, the son was martyred causing great personal as well as economic loss for the 
family.  
Interestingly, there was little evidence of local credit networks. Respondents reported relying on 
credit from sources outside the village – namely valley shopkeepers. This had detrimental effects 
as this credit was reported to be given with interest, even when it was in kind for food. The 
weakness of local credit relations is quite different from the other villages and perhaps reflects 
the social and economic marginality of the village. The inability to provide much credit within the 
village reflects the declining or struggling livelihood trajectory of all the study households, in part 
due to declining livestock herds sold off due to loss of opium income and dry conditions 
deteriorating pasture lands. There was also evidence of food rationing among the households in 
the two lower wealth groups. These conditions weakened mutual help relations, illustrating their 
precariousness in times of hardship, particularly in more remote locations.  
Village BB’s relatively greater inequalities in land holdings appear to have been coupled with self 
interest among the landed elite. This means that the village does not have a strong orientation 
toward providing social goods or towards mutual support; the latter is evident but not to the 
extent as in village BA. The head of household B70, among the wealthy case households, is well 
connected as a relative of two other land owners from whom he sharecrops in land. This means 
he has secure relations with them and confidence that the sharecrop arrangements he relies on 
to accumulate and maintain his wealth will not be arbitrarily removed. This has helped his 
household, but not necessarily the village. He also relates in his interview how the village doesn’t 
have connections in Kabul to support the village, and did not support Zalmay Khan’s bid for 
parliament and therefore cannot get help from him either.  
The other households describe the use of social relationships primarily for employment and 
credit. In the former case, household B77 has an uncle in Kabul working with the national 
directorate of security and through him a son obtained a job in the police force. This household 
also expressed clearly how the poor depend on the wealthy. However, the recent dry period and 
loss of opium income means that the ability of the better off to provide assistance is declining. 
Most respondent households in this village report accessing informal credit from local families or 
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shopkeepers, without interest. This form of mutual help seems more common than in village BC, 
though maintaining these links is again dependent on having a reputation to repay.  
Village BA seems to show more community cohesion, future orientation and action among the 
elite to work for the village good and not just its own advancement than the other villages. A 
moral economy seems to have survived recent economic struggles and the decline of its agrarian 
economy. The only case household in the highest wealth group is strongly connected outward – 
in the past to Commander Najmuddin8 and currently to Zalmay Khan – showing evidence of 
secondary inclusion. The household has gained materially from these links, according to both the 
household head’s own words and reports of others. A less educated daughter obtained a 
teaching post, a son was aided in his desire to transfer from Herat to Kabul University for his 
studies and a nephew obtained work in the lapis lazuli mine. So, while linkages and benefits in 
this village are more widely shared, this does not preclude private benefits or some measure of 
self interested action. 
Household A34 provided the village its initial connection to Najmuddin; the head studied with 
Najmuddin at agricultural college and he used this link to request village benefits from the lapis 
mine after Najmuddin gained political power in the province. However, while villagers gained 
some employment from this link, Najmuddin responded strategically to the request, noting how 
the people from village BA were his people and could be counted on, so he needed to share the 
benefits of the mine more widely to build relations with strangers. HHA34 is an example of how, 
in the complex Afghan local political context, some households need to carefully balance social 
connections. The household is related to two rival local commanders with different reputations 
in the village. Commander Samad appears more exploitative and is disliked; hence household 
A34 did not support his actions during periods of fighting, seeking to maintain a distance and 
therefore his relationships in the village. Commander Mahboob is better liked in the village 
because he provides assistance, but has bad relations with this household due to its links to 
Samad.  
Mahboob’s help is illustrated in the case of household A23. The two households are related and 
Mahboob was able to get a local construction contract through the help of Zalmay Khan; he then 
provided the son in household A23 with work. This illustrates the rather typical use of 
relationships for employment related assistance. Interestingly though, three of the households 
in the sample obtained work with a major international NGO working in the village but the use 
of connections appeared limited in these processes. Instead a driving skill or education level 
played a larger role.  
Internal credit relations appear strong in the village, even with the decline of agriculture. 
Relatives who are shopkeepers are important for the credit networks of some, ensuring interest 
free in kind credit. These relationships can come at the cost of reduced choice, however, as the 
case of household A24 shows. It learned the hard way not to purchase from other than its 
shopkeeper relative after buying some goods at lower price in the district center. For a time 
after this, credit relations with the relative stopped, with comments made about the 
household’s ability to go to Baharak for supplies. As the head relates, ‘After that we stopped 
bringing things from other places and we continued borrowing from him again’.  
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The credit relations, investment in education in the village and its willingness to ensure past 
benefits of employment in the mine were shared, all show social cohesion. Social cohesion is 
also evident, along with the important, though perhaps weakening role of the moral economy, 
through the strength of charitable relations in the village and their entitlement status among the 
poor households in the sample.  
Three of the four households in the poorest wealth group rely on charity as a major component 
of their livelihoods, particularly the obligatory giving of zakat.9 Household A27 is headed by a 
male of 75 years and has three other members but no able bodied male labour. One relative in 
the village helped the family get an electricity connection and gives zakat annually to the 
household, composed of a seer of rice, one kilogram each of tea and sugar, and some soap. On 
top of this about 20 other households provide two kilograms of wheat each as charity post 
harvest, however the family’s ability to depend on this varies with the level of agricultural 
output. This year the female head of household reported much less was provided due to 
drought. The male head noted how household A38 used to give zakat but has not recently since 
his crops were not good. 
Household A33 more stridently reports the recent decline in levels of help. His household of 
eight relies on irregular wage income, charity and food aid provided by WFP linked to girls’ 
school attendance. While he has many relatives in the village few provide help, because, in his 
view they are made happy by others’ worsening condition. This reflects his personal 
circumstance where he had to leave work in the lapis mine after 20 years due to its effect on his 
health, leading him to sell off the livestock accumulated during that prosperous period. He has 
no land and had to sell a garden plot as well. His ill health has made him dependent on others, a 
change in circumstance that has brought him shame. He is less adversely incorporated into 
dependent relations than dismayed by a loss of dignity due to dependence. He notes how the 
nature of relationships has changed in his perspective, highlighting the limits to informal help 
relations: ‘In the past economy was not important to build relations. People loved and helped 
each other in case of need in any situation. But now it is not like that. Whoever loses his 
economy loses his relations as well, because now people are eager to strengthen their economy 
and they do not care for relations’. Even with its economic and social downturn the three 
children in the household (2 girls and 1 boy) have remained in school. The parents are motivated 
to educate their children due to their own illiteracy, the enrollment of most children in school 
and role models in the village who are educated and have better jobs. This prioritisation could 
serve the household well in the medium to long term.  
The case of household A22 also provides support for the perceived change in value placed on 
relationships, at least on the part of close relations. The head fell ill and lost the family’s main 
source of income from his work maintaining a local shrine. His weakness and inability to 
contribute to the joint family led to his brothers separating households to avoid the burden of 
supporting his five members. This shows a self interest and weighing of economy over relations 
as noted above, perhaps necessary for a poor household in the declining economic condition of 
the village and recent dry spell. However the household also is related to A38 and receives 
charity from them, but again reportedly not this year due to the drought.  
                                                          
9
 The giving of a small percentage of one’s possessions to the poor and needy. 
Bath Papers in International Development 
Paper Number 12 
16 | P a g e  
 
These three households show the damaging social and economic effects of ill health and the 
precariousness of dependence in a local economy that is in decline; while still considering 
themselves entitled to charity, and receiving some, this support seems less and less guaranteed. 
Poor household A36 illustrates the value of mutual help relations when there are workers and 
other resources present to contribute to their maintenance and assure others of the ability to 
reciprocate help given. This household of 11 struggles to earn enough to meet consumption 
needs; it has three male workers though one is 17 and is in school as well as recently working 
part time. All five school age children study, illustrating a willingness to struggle today to see a 
better future; this may in part reflect the literacy of the male head. The household owns land 
and has more livestock than the other families in the poorest wealth group, giving it more 
resources in general to work with than the others. The head is also strong in help relationships 
with those more powerful; the head of A38 is his cousin and Commander Mahboob is also a 
relative. They both are reported to help the household often. However, the male head is also 
clear about the value of mutual help relations and those with shopkeepers. In relation to the 
latter he notes his reputation as a hard worker who repays whenever he has money, so he has 
no problems in borrowing. He also clearly invests time and energy in his mutual relationships. 
‘Relations with other people are very valuable for me…It [relations] is kept secure by mutual 
respect, by visiting and helping each other in case of need’.  
As noted in the village description, the provision of public and social goods is important in this 
village and the norm of school attendance, supported by aid allocations for girls’ attendance, 
motivates even the poorer households to keep children in school. However, its poor agricultural 
economy means that the functioning of the moral economy varies with the size of agricultural 
output and some report a weakening of social obligations to the poor. On its own, even with its 
significant external connections, the village is unable to overcome its structural limits due to 
remoteness and low agricultural productivity. Its ability to depend in the long term on the 
agricultural economy is unlikely, as those who more recently prospered did so through having 
the skills and resources to access NGO salaried work. Given this medium to long term prospect, 
the attention to education will serve the residents well through providing boys and girls more 
choices outside the village than if this route had not been taken.  
5 Discussion 
The five village contexts described above show clear differences in terms of levels of dependent 
security and opportunities for autonomous development. This section integrates the empirical 
material with the literature to understand the factors underlying the relative positions of villages 
on a continuum of dependent security, and the different abilities of households to operate 
within these positions to achieve a measure of security.  
 
 
Figure 1: Position of villages on continuum of dependent security 
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The figure above places the study villages in relative positions along a continuum of dependent 
security, with the left side representing village structures more closely approximating an 
informal security regime, including high levels of dependence, clientelism and self-interest, and 
the right representing structures oriented more toward the social good, with social relationships 
less characterized by adverse incorporation and more by mutual obligation and help which 
support more autonomous development.  
The social, economic and political context of Kandahar Province, particularly its embeddedness 
in high level patronage networks linked to Kabul’s political elite and to the extensive aid and 
military establishment, has shaped village experiences, making social inequalities more extreme 
than in the Badakhshan study areas. Connections to provincial powerbrokers, particularly 
Ahmad Wali Karzai, who then have links to the centre, drive privilege and the data show how 
privilege is used for personal gain, often to the detriment of others with less power who are 
adversely incorporated into relationships with little voice and few exit opportunities. Village KA, 
with its powerful and politically connected landlord, most closely represents characteristics of an 
informal security regime in which many achieve security through dependence, and relationships 
to state power are used for personal gain. However, this doesn’t mean some have not been able 
to escape. Village KB has more diffuse power than KA and the maliks, and particularly those with 
connections to the Karzai family, are socially well positioned to control local resources and 
obtain privileged positions for sons generating significant income. Local leaders are not working 
for the village good, and even relatives are not guaranteed to benefit from the maliks’ positions; 
the head malik exhibits predatory power. The maliks’ social position has provided economic 
security, for as long as the current political situation holds. So the local power holders in both 
villages are also dependent – on the continuation of the current political economy operating in 
Kandahar and Kabul - and are therefore potential spoilers of international efforts to formalize 
and reform state structures.  
The Badakhshan study villages are positioned relatively closer to the autonomous development 
side of the continuum, with BA closest to this outcome among the three. While social and 
economic inequalities exist in the villages they are enacted differently than in the Kandahar 
villages, perhaps due to the villages’ relative economic marginality, harsh winters and general 
precariousness; households across wealth groups are all at risk of decline and therefore might 
place more value on the maintenance of reciprocal relationships and not alienating those from 
which they one day might need help. There is more evidence of a moral economy and efforts to 
use social relationships to support the social good, though this is far more apparent in village BA, 
and underlies its placement in the figure. Village BC, with its protectorate status and minority 
ethnic group is the poorest in social and other resources, even to the extent of not being able to 
support a local credit network; it is the least connected and most dependent. There is evidence 
of the protector’s and a local general’s use of power for their own ends, but the adverse 
elements of the village’s incorporation into these relationships seem less severe or pervasive 
than for those dependent on local power holders in the Kandahar villages. Village BB falls 
between the other two Badakhshan villages, with higher land inequalities than in the other 
villages, a stronger agrarian economy that enabled greater self sufficiency, so less push for 
external connections. However, it provided less evidence of orientation to social good than 
village BA meaning it is placed further from the autonomous development side of the 
continuum.  
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Within these village classifications, what factors provided different households with more 
options for security, and particularly for voice and exit from negative social relationships? What 
role have reciprocal and/or charitable relationships played? The household cases clearly show 
that connections to those in power outside of the village can bring personal gain; this evidence 
was stronger in the Kandahar villages because of the link to state power. Some even advanced 
from a position of relative economic insecurity to prosperity due to their social connections to 
the politically powerful (HHs KA05, KB42). The extent to which these households diversify their 
connections and livelihood activities will influence their long term potential, particularly for 
those whose social and economic position is related to the current political context.  
Those not labeled among the privileged or secondarily included, but who were able to achieve 
some measure of security often did so due to being rich in able-bodied male labour. This 
enabled diversification of livelihoods but was not necessarily sufficient to enable exit from 
adverse relations of dependence. This constraint was apparent in village KA due to the 
oppressive role of landlord LLA and his clients’ unwillingness to risk his response if they were to 
break the relationship. This unwillingness is most apparent in the case of household A12, which 
has three income sources from the landlord and two separate from him, but still felt unable to 
shift more sources away from LLA. Those able to depend less on work from LLA, like household 
A16, seem to do better. This includes having informal credit sources other than the landlord. In 
Village KB the risks associated with trying to diversify and prosper are shown in case B46 which 
lost sharecrop land from one landlord due at least in part to the sons’ desire to take on two 
contracts at once – this led to questions of loyalty.  
The role of informal credit in aiding some to gain independence and begin to prosper is mainly 
found in Kandahar, related to the opportunities the urban centre provides. Two households in 
fact showed remarkable agency in exiting negative social relationships and slowly prospering, 
and with only one male worker in each. Their ability to access informal credit from ‘friendly 
sources’ and on good terms, their own forward looking and risk taking orientations as well as 
their energy enabled them to take up the opportunities Kandahar city offered. For household 
A03, his disability, and potentially less perceived ‘usefulness’ to landlord LLA, may have given 
him more scope to exit his sharecrop arrangement than others.  
These two cases highlight the role of reciprocity in Afghan rural livelihoods; it was the ability to 
access credit free of economic costs which enabled in part the households’ progress. Other 
cases, and particularly some in village BA, illustrate the role of moral obligation through 
charitable relations as means through which some households achieved a measure of security – 
dependent yes, but not necessarily exploitative. Moral obligation and mutual exchange relations 
are the main forms of available social insurance and much is done to invest in relationships with 
peers and relatives in recognition of this, including ensuring conformity to social norms to 
maintain belonging and keeping a reputation of creditworthiness for as long as possible. While 
these relationships cannot be romanticized – some expressed reduced choice of credit sources 
because they could not risk existing relationships, others noted the precariousness of relying on 
help in times of economic decline – their importance in a context lacking formal social protection 
or the scope for such intervention at the necessary scale in the short to medium term - cannot 
be highlighted enough. The question then becomes, what can be done to support these self help 
mechanisms. Those with able bodied labour or able to maintain credit worthiness and invest in 
mutual relationships had more scope to exit negative forms of dependent relations, were those 
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perhaps more closely associated with a Faustian bargain where options other than short term 
security are available, but may not be ‘chosen’ because of related risks. The case households 
lacking male workers due to age, ill health or extent of disability, were those most tied to 
dependent relationships, with few options other than these for any level of security. Some of 
these households may be supported through obligation and therefore not incorporated into 
adverse relations of exploitation, but they rely on the stability of these social norms and the 
economic prospects of the village, and risk exchanging their dignity for security (case BA33). 
These relations of moral obligation were more evident in Badakhshan. In village KA the two 
poorest case households (A00 and A12) had few choices about how to seek security – it was 
through LLA. However the conditions of this work for A00, and the lack of any other household 
member to work apart from the female head, made this an ‘optionless choice’ and pleasing LLA 
and his family central to their survival.  
Patronage relations with varying degrees of exploitation and moral obligation, and reciprocal 
relationships of mutual help, define the social and economic life of the rural Afghan villages 
studied, and provide variable levels of security and autonomy based on proximity to 
opportunities, household demographics and labour power, and risk taking orientations. The 
conclusion briefly considers whether current social and economic policy in Afghanistan 
adequately engages with these social complexities to support rural poverty reduction, and how 
policies can be improved to better to reflect this social reality and therefore come closer to 
achieving their aims. 
6 Conclusion 
The Afghan government with support from the international community has over the last four 
years embarked on the process of developing and beginning to implement a poverty reduction 
strategy paper – the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). This document has 
significant rhetoric about pro-poor growth and inclusion and develops a detailed poverty profile, 
but what is missing is an analysis of Afghan social life and how it might support or impede 
progress on poverty reduction. Efforts in 2009-2010 to re-prioritise the ANDS to speed 
implementation show the same gaps, and may be even worse since any focus on social 
protection, which had its own strategy in the original document, is largely lost in a focus on 
ramping up growth. Above all however, both the original ANDS and the new prioritized 
programmes show little interest in the presence of social inequality and unequal power 
relations, or of their role in creating and maintaining poverty. Policy solutions are simplified to 
fill gaps in access to resources like credit, skills, or agricultural inputs, without considering who 
might benefit and how social norms and existing inequalities might intervene in their 
distribution. There is no evidence of an effort to grapple with the social complexities shaping 
Afghan life, leading to technical solutions to problems with power and politics at their core.  
The evidence from this study of rural livelihood change shows how this overly technical 
approach is grossly inadequate to the task at hand. It has illustrated how social relationships are 
central to Afghan life; how ‘belonging’ provides a base of social and economic security through 
mutual support networks offering credit and help in times of need, enables receipt of charity 
and also provides patronage links to the well resourced, which can be highly exploitative. This 
security may come with dependence, but given the institutional context within which most must 
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negotiate, this is perceived to be the best available option for many. The study also highlighted 
the precariousness of these relationships of mutual support or moral obligation, particularly in 
periods of economic downturn, as well as the risks embedded in individual efforts to exit the 
more exploitative forms of clientelism identified, meaning few try to do so. There is therefore a 
role for policy and programming to undergird existing informal support mechanisms to increase 
their reliability and to protect individual efforts to secure more autonomy, facilitating collective 
efforts to bring about change. However, post-2001 Afghanistan illustrates the seeming 
unwillingness of many national and international policy makers to engage with social complexity 
and to orient policy processes to the needs of Afghans. This unwillingness, compounded by the 
benefits gleaned by some powerful state actors and their local clients from systems creating and 
maintaining social inequality, means this role is unlikely to be fulfilled in the short term. 
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Appendix 1: Kandahar study village characteristics 
 KA  KB  
Location/accessibility  Peri-urban; 10-15 minute 
drive from Kdr city  
Peri-urban; 10-15 minute 
drive from Kdr city  
Demographics  Pashtun (Popalzai)  
Low educational 
attainment & enrollment 
High in-migration 
(sharecrop for main 
landlord)  
Pashtun (Popalzai)  
Low educational 
attainment & enrollment  
Livelihoods  Non farm labour, 
agriculture  
Opium in past but never 
extensively cultivated  
Agriculture, livestock, 
non farm labor  
Land holdings  High inequality; 2 land 
holders, one with 
significant sharecropping 
relations  
Inequality but less than 
KA; approx 500 ha 
irrigated land in total  
Aid/services  No school; district 
receives aid due to 
relative security  
Primary school but poor 
functioning, low 
attendance; literacy 
school for girls – 
commandeered by 
uneducated malik family  
Local leaders  Khan with considerable, 
almost feudal, control; 
also malik, head of CDC 
(self-appointed). Armed 
for own protection  
6 maliks: head, sub head 
and 4 others. Head holds 
most power. Heads CDC – 
for all maliks’ benefit  
Conflict history  Post 2001 relative 
security  
Outmigration during 
conflict; return during 
Taliban  
Soviet period 
bombardment due to 
proximity to airport  
Post 2001 relative 
security  
Outmigration during 
conflict; return during 
Taliban  
Connections  Karzai’s home district  
Khan linked to current 
central & provincial 
government  
Karzai’s home district  
Maliks linked to current 
central & provincial 
government  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Badakhshan study village characteristics 
 BA  BB  BC  
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Location/accessibility  3 hours drive from district 
center; 2000m above sea 
level (masl)  
45 minute drive from 
district center; 1200 masl; 
best placed for land, 
water and market access  
2 hour drive from district 
center; only recently 
connected to road from 
valley; 2000 masl  
Demographics  Largely Sunni; few Ismaili 
HHs; long education 
history; high education 
attainment and 
attendance (m/f)  
Less education 
investment; school 
destroyed in conflict – 
not rebuilt until after 
2001  
Largely Ismaili and closely 
related; school was 
distant – few males 
benefited. Higher school 
attendance than BB now 
but limited by need for 
children’s labour  
Livelihoods  Seasonal migration; 
livestock; lapis lazuli 
mines; opium at small 
scale  
Decline in opium and loss 
of link to mine  
Agrarian economy; 
livestock; sharecrop in 
other villages  
Flourished with opium 
cultivation; resisted 
eradication but decline in 
cultivation post 2006  
Outmigration; army & 
police employment  
Grain deficits; seasonal 
migration; wage labour  
Opium cultivation but 
limited scale due to small 
land holdings; more wage 
labour  
Drought in 2008 led to 
migration to Iran  
Land holdings  Low inequality; largest 
holding approx 4 ha 
irrigated land; 160 ha 
irrigated land in total and 
240 ha rainfed land  
High land inequality; 47 
ha irrigated land in total 
and 13 ha rainfed  
Pasture land reportedly 
taken for others – no 
response due to lack of 
power; 10 ha irrigated 
land and 40 ha rainfed  
Aid/services  AKF: education, safe 
water, road 
improvement, micro 
hydel scheme  
Weak CDC  
Opposition to CDC from 
local power holders  
Access to a school and 
clinic in valley; no safe 
water  
Weak CDC but did pave 
road to valley  
Local leaders  Managed conflict in 
mujahiddin time but 
carried out own violence; 
link to power holder in 
early 1990s  
After 1989 local 
commanders appointed 
versus chosen - brutal  
Post 1992 village 
commander sought 
protection from a 
predatory commander  
Conflict history  Local leader (selected) 
able to minimize 
exposure during 1980s  
Strong resistance to pro 
communist govt; heavy 
conflict locally but village 
defended  
Religious minority status 
meant hostility and 
persecution 1978-92 but 
no direct war; post 1992 
close to front line  
Connections  Educated elite in govt 
positions, with NGOs.  
Diverse political 
connections, including to 
commander controlling 
lapis mine for a period 
(Najmuddin); externally 
linked  
Under Najmuddin’s 
authority – he appointed 
local commanders  
Few other links for 
strategic advantage; 
distance from Zalmay 
Khan  
Link to protective 
commander (Qutbiddin) 
post 1992 – patron who 
secured allegiance 
through ensuring physical 
security  
No independent 
connections outside  
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